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In Belgium, income-related inequality in ill-health seems to favour the rich, meaning 
that the rich are generally in better health than the poor are.  Restricting the analysis to 
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income-related inequality in ill-health among the 65+.  Since it is not clear whether 
the absence in inequality stems from the limited variation in the income of the 65+ 
(because of welfare benefits) or whether it truly reflects reality, I did the analysis over 
again using estimates of permanent income instead of income.  It turned out that 
inequality among the 65+ remained very limited indeed, yet robustness checks 
pointed to the fragility of the results. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper, I focus on socio-economic inequality in ill-health1.  The research 
question boils down to the following: are the poorer members in better (worse) health 
than the richer members of society are?  This question is of considerable importance.  
Indeed, the answer can be used to evaluate the performance of health care systems.  
More specifically, it can be used to evaluate the output of health care systems in terms 
of its capacity to reduce income-related inequity in ill-health.  However, the merits 
should not be exaggerated.  There is no focus on efficiency of health care systems, nor 
on the mean level of ill-health in a society.  Moreover, a high level of inequity does 
not necessarily point to a bad performance of a health care system.  Two distinct 
societies might have a different degree of inequity, but both health care systems might 
be equally performing in terms of reducing income-related inequity in ill-health.  
Differences in income inequality and income-related health behaviour (e.g. smoking) 
might account for the above.  Notwithstanding the limitations of the research 
question, it remains interesting from a positive point of view.  Knowing whether the 
poor are less (more) healthy than the rich, is interesting in itself and could help policy 
makers in formulating health care policy. 
 
This analysis builds on two strands of literature: on the one hand, the permanent 
income hypothesis and on the other hand the existing literature on socio-economic 
inequality in ill-health. 
The latter resulted for the most form the ECuity project.  The ECuity project was 
founded in the late eighties and intends to look deeper into equity issues of health care 
 
1 Note that I use inequality in ill-health instead of inequality in health.  In section 2.1, I describe the 
importance to distinguish. 
systems within European countries (+US).  The major aim is to do comparative 
analysis and to find causal linkages between characteristics and outcomes of health 
care systems.  A specific methodology was developed to measure socio-economic 
inequality in ill-health.  First, income, as a measure of socio-economic status, is used 
to stratify the sample.  Next, concentration curves and indices are applied to the 
stratified sample to quantify the possibly existing inequity in ill-health.  In all 
participating countries, a negative relationship was found between socio-economic 
status and ill-health status, i.e. the richer are in general in better health than the poorer 
are. (e.g., van Doorslaer et al., 1997; Humphries and van Doorslaer, 2000; De Graeve 
and Duchesne, 1997) 
 
In this paper, the Belgian situation is reanalysed using a different methodology.  
Instead of using income as a measure of socio-economic status, I use permanent 
income.  The use of an alternative measure was inspired by previous, but unpublished 
research2; i.e. there seems to be no income-related inequality in ill-health among 
persons of at least 65 years (65+).  In contrast, significant inequity is found for the 
entire population.  Two possible routes could be explored.  First, one could do nothing 
and conclude that indeed there does not exist any income-related inequality in ill-
health among the 65+.  Second, one could try another proxy for socio-economic status 
and add the results to the existing evidence.  Such a procedure might further clarify 
the relationship between socio-economic status and inequality in ill-health.  In this 
analysis, I opted for permanent income.  This choice was dictated by the limited 
variation in the income of the 65+ (because of welfare benefits), which might account 
for the absence of any inequality in ill-health.  Using permanent income instead might 
 
2 Previous as well as current results are presented in this paper. 
give a better idea of one's socio-economic status, certainly for the older members of 
society.  Off course, one could opt for other proxies of socio-economic status as well.  
The obvious choice would be to complement the income data with data on income 
from financial assets, etc.  Another possibility consists of computing concentration 
curves and indices for different characteristics of one's socio-economic status (e.g. 
education, income, etc).  Nevertheless, given the data limitations, I opt for permanent 
incomes.  They will be estimated using the methodology proposed by King & Dicks-
Mireaux (1982). 
 
The second section of this paper deals with the theoretical aspects.  Concentration 
curves, indices and the estimating strategy to compute permanent incomes will be 
briefly discussed.  The data are dealt with in the third section.  Additional econometric 
theory and the estimation of permanent income in terms of observables are given in 
section four.  The fifth part discusses the results and finally I conclude. 
 
2.  The methodologies applied 
 
In this part, both methodologies are explained.  In the first section, I describe the 
ECuity methodology, which is applied except for the stratification variable, namely 
income.  Instead, I use permanent income.  The estimating strategy is dealt with in the 
second section. 
 
 
 
 
2.1.  Measuring socio-economic inequality in ill-health 
 
As explained in the introduction, a specific methodology to quantify socio-economic 
inequality in ill-health was developed for the ECuity project.  Wagstaff et al. (1991) 
compared different inequality measures frequently used in the income inequality 
literature.  They concluded that concentration curves and indices are best suited to 
measure socio-economic inequality in ill-health.  First of all, concentration curves and 
indices reflect inequality in ill-health and emphasise its relation with the socio-
economic dimension.  Second, they take the experience – in terms of ill-health and 
income – of the entire population into account.  Third, changes in the distribution of 
socio-economic status (e.g. a transfer of ill-health from a disadvantaged to an 
advantaged person) are reflected.  Fourth, concentration curves and indices can be 
visually represented.  Finally, both measures "have a firm grounding in the literature 
on income distribution and redistribution – its properties and the value judgements 
underlying it are therefore reasonably well understood". (cit., van Doorslaer et al., 
1997) 
 
In the following, I briefly discuss the concentration curve and index.  In a first step, 
one must stratify the sample by socio-economic status.  This implies that we rank the 
individuals by socio-economic status, beginning with the least advantaged.  Next, 
supposing we have a continuous measure of ill-health, we can construct an illness 
concentration curve [L(p)].  L(p) plots the cumulative proportion of ill-health against 
the cumulative proportion of the population, ranked by socio-economic status.  From 
the definition it is immediately clear that we face a relative measure, i.e. L(p) is 
independent of the mean level of income and ill-health, and proportional changes in 
ill-health do not change the concentration curve.  In figure 1, an illness concentration 
curve is depicted. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
If the concentration curve lies above the diagonal, the more disadvantaged members 
of society have a higher share of total ill-health.  In other words, they are less healthy 
than the advantaged members of society are. (pro-rich inequity)  If the concentration 
curve lies entirely underneath the diagonal, the opposite can be concluded. (pro-poor 
inequity)  Coincidence of the concentration curve and the diagonal reflects socio-
economic equality in ill-health.  A last possibility concerns an intersection between 
the concentration curve and the diagonal.  In this case, compensation arises between 
pro-rich and pro-poor inequity. 
 
One can compare inequality in different (sub) populations by means of two or more 
concentration curves.  If a concentration curve is dominated, one could conclude that 
there is unambiguously less inequality in ill-health.3  The inequality ranking is, 
however, partial in the sense that one cannot rank intersecting curves.  In that case, 
one might calculate a concentration index (CI) that yields a complete ordering.  CI is 
defined as twice the area between L(p) and the diagonal.  Since I use grouped data 
(see section 5), we have the following definition (assuming that L(p) is piecewise 
linear): 
 
 
3 "We conjecture that it would be possible to prove an analogue of the theorem of Atkinson for the case 
of health inequality, the difference being that the ranking variable in this case is not health but rather 
socio-economic status.  This aversion to socio-economic inequality would need taking into account into 
the social welfare function." (van Doorslaer et al., 1997, p. 96) 
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where µ is mean ill-health, ft is the proportion of individuals in socio-economic group 
t, µt is ill-health in socio-economic group t and Rt is the relative rank of socio-
economic group t.  CI takes values between –1 and +1.  It takes –1 (+1) if total ill-
health is solely concentrated among the least (most) advantaged socio-economic 
group.  Intermediate values are either favouring the more or less advantaged socio-
economic groups overall.  The italics are important since it is theoretically possible 
that the corresponding concentration curve crosses the diagonal. 
 
Kakwani et al. (1997) constructed a distribution-free asymptotic estimator for the 
variance of CI.  It can be used to perform hypothesis testing. 
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In the above description, I have assumed that we have a continuous ill-health 
measure.  However, as in most data sets, I have a categorical ill-health measure at my 
disposal (e.g. how is your health status in general: very good, good, moderate, bad or 
very bad?).  Therefore, one has to transform the categorical measure into a continuous 
one.  Wagstaff & van Doorslaer (1994) propose a procedure based on the standard 
lognormal distribution.  The standard lognormal distribution is chosen for since it 
imposes skewness in the distribution of ill-health, i.e. only a minority of the 
population claims to suffer from severe illness whereas the majority has no illness 
whatsoever.  The continuous ill-health measure is obtained by dividing the area under 
the standard lognormal density function.  It is divided up in such a way that the areas 
correspond to the sample proportions of each respond category.  One then obtains a 
continuous measure that gives higher values to more severe ill-health statuses.  The 
whole procedure, however, relies crucially upon the choice for the standard lognormal 
distribution.  Since there is no other justification than the skewed nature of this 
distribution function, some authors have compared the use of the above constructed 
ill-health measure with other ill-health measures that are continuous by definition 
(e.g. time trade-off method, etc.).  Gerdtham et al. (1999) and Humphries & van 
Doorslaer (2000) found no statistically significant difference between the various 
methods.  It results that there is additional evidence that the standard lognormal 
distribution is a reasonable choice indeed. 
 
Finally, some words on standardisation and on ill-health versus health.  As Sen (1992) 
argued, there might be a difference between measuring inequality of shortfalls and 
inequality of attainments, i.e. between inequality of ill-health versus health.  "Should 
a person's position be judged, positively, in terms of the level of achievement, or 
negatively, in terms of the shortfall vis-à-vis what she could have maximally 
achieved?" (cit., Sen, 1992)  The answer is a difficult one, but it should be clear that 
both strategies could give rise to different conclusions if the maximally achievable 
position varies over the population.  It might well be that all persons are in equal 
health, but only few would be willing to state that there is no inequality in this 
situation.  A person of twenty years experiencing the same health as a person of 
eighty years seems unequal since the former may be expected to have a greater 
shortfall than the latter. 
Because of the above I use inequality of ill-health instead of inequality of health 
throughout this paper.  The distinction is however unclear since I use a subjective ill-
health variable; it depends on whether individuals answer in terms of attainments or 
shortfalls on the “how is your health in general?” question.  Moreover, defining what 
is a person's maximally achievable health status seems even a greater challenge.  In 
the context of the ECuity project, one has addressed the problem by standardising the 
ill-health variable.  In this paper, I use the direct standardisation method.  "This 
involves applying the age-sex specific average illness rate of each socio-economic 
group to the age and gender structure of the population.  The standardised ill-health 
rate for socio-economic group t is equal to:" (cit., Wagstaff et al., 1997) 
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where nd is the number of persons in dth demographic group and µdt is the ill-health 
rate amongst persons in the dth demographic group in socio-economic group t.  If one 
would not make a demographic adjustment, one would assume that all inequality is 
avoidable.  Remembering the example of the twenty year versus eighty year old 
person, it seems reasonable to assume that standardisation eliminates unavoidable 
inequality attributable to demographic differences over the socio-economic groups. 
 
The procedure outlined in this section can be briefly summarised as follows.  First, 
one has to transform the categorical ill-health measure into a continuous one.  Next, 
one applies direct standardisation to the continuous ill-health measure in order to be 
able to measure avoidable inequality.  Finally, a concentration curve or index is 
calculated based on the standardised ill-health measure. 
 
2.2.  Estimating permanent income 
 
King & Dicks-Mireaux (1982) examined the life-cycle hypothesis for wealth 
holdings.  This hypothesis assumes a non-linear relationship between the ratio of 
wealth to permanent income and age.  They define permanent income as normal age-
adjusted earnings.  In the remainder of this section, I summarise their estimating 
strategy for permanent incomes. 
 
Permanent income, Yi, is defined as follows: 
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where Xi is a vector of observable individual characteristics, Si consists of a vector of 
unobservable individual characteristics and c(Ai) denotes the cohort effect.  The latter 
is included since "for given Xi younger generations are better off than their elders 
because of technical progress and capital accumulation" (cit., King and Dicks-
Mireaux, 1982).  We, however, do observe current earnings instead of permanent 
income.  Current earnings, Eit, are assumed to deviate from permanent income 
because of an age-earnings profile and transitory components of earnings (which are 
assumed independent of Si). 
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where f denotes the age-earnings profile, Ä is the age on which permanent income is 
evaluated and uit denotes the transitory component of current earnings. 
 
In fact, I will be using (5) to obtain estimates of permanent income (evaluated at age 
Ä).  Since I use a cross-section, one cannot estimate Si, nor can one separately identify 
the age-earnings profile and the cohort effect.  King & Dicks-Mireaux propose the 
following strategies.  To obtain an estimate of the age-earnings profile, f, they 
"assume that one-half of the growth of real earnings was accounted for by…factors 
used as explanatory variables in the earnings equation, and that the other half was 
accounted for by technological progress and capital accumulation.  The latter is the 
cohort effect." (cit., King and Dicks-Mireaux, 1982)  Estimates of Si are obtained by 
applying ols to (5) and noting that: 
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The use of a cross-section implies that we restrict the value of δ to a particular value.  
Since particular values are chosen for the importance of the cohort effect vis-à-vis the 
age-earnings profile and for δ, I perform various sensitivity analyses.  Combining (4) 
– (6) we get an estimate for permanent income: 
 
        
         (7) 
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The estimate for permanent income is used as stratification variable to compute 
concentration indices. 
 
3.  Data 
 
I use the PSBH data set, a sample of the Belgian population over 15 years.  In 1994, 
6461 individuals were questioned on different socio-economic variables, including 
health status. 
In the introduction, I mentioned that previous but unpublished research pointed out 
that there does not seem to exist any income-related inequality in ill-health among the 
65+.  In table 1, the various variables for this specific analysis are shown. 
 
[Table 1] 
 After deleting missing values, 5926 observations were left.  Income is household 
income (defined as monthly net disposable income) corrected for family structure.  
Sah1-5 is a self-reported, categorical ill-health measure.  Age and sex are used to 
standardise the ill-health measure.  In line with the ECuity project, I defined eight 
demographic groups, i.e. four age groups applied to both sexes (16-34, 35-44, 45-64 
& 65+). 
Estimating permanent income resulted in an additional number of missing values - 
5548 observations were left.  Therefore, I represent in table 2 all the variables used to 
estimate permanent income and to compute the corresponding concentration indices.  
The variables from table 1 are depicted for the reduced sample as well.  They are used 
to compute a ‘reference’ concentration index, against which one can evaluate the 
results for the concentration indices based on permanent income.4  (income has only 
5110 observations, since I am only able to provide 5110 estimates of permanent 
income although I have 5548 observations, see section 5 for more) 
 
[Table 2] 
 
Labinc represents monthly net individual labour income and will be used as the 
dependent variable in (5).  Households headed by widows are deleted since no 
information is available on the income of the deceased husband.  Educ1-5 are four 
dummies, reflecting educational status.  Educ2, standing for lower secondary school, 
is excluded from the regression analysis.  Next, two regional dummies are constructed 
 
4 Calculation of the 'reference' index based on individual labour income seems obvious at first sight.  
However, the high number of zero incomes makes the analysis impracticable, i.e. concentration indices 
are based on rankings of the individuals in terms of their income.  Since the number of zero incomes 
amounts to more than 2000 observations, none of the 2000 can be ranked. 
to reflect the federal structure of Belgium (Flanders is suppressed).  Income from 
financial assets is reflected in finas.  Adult, child and out designate family structure.  
Out is particularly important since it takes one if the respective household has 
children that are independent and living outdoors.  These children are not reflected in 
the adult variable, but might be important for obtaining a consistent estimate of 
permanent income of the older population.  Disc1-5 is an additional self-reported, 
categorical ill-health measure.  It focuses on chronic illness and determines the degree 
of discomfort suffered from it.  Disc0, taking one if one reports no chronic illness, is 
excluded.  Finally, there is a set of dummies reflecting occupational structure (persons 
with no work and unskilled labourers are suppressed). 
 
Finally, some words on omitted, but possibly relevant variables for the regression 
analysis of equation (5).  First, it was impossible to find a variable reflecting the 
demand side of the labour market.  Several possibilities (unemployment rates) were 
looked for, but none of the definitions remained unchanged over the relevant period.  
Second, equation (5) is estimated on the level of the individual.  Therefore, the labour 
market participation of the other household members might influence the labour 
market participation decision (and the number of hours worked) of the individual.  
However, for the elder subsample, the data set does not give any indication on the 
number of persons working in the household or on the number of hours worked by the 
other household members.  Neither does it indicate the labour income of other 
household members.  This is to be expected since the data set examines current 
position of the individuals.  As such, retired individuals do not report past labour 
market position (past occupation is reported).  Since I am primarily interested in the 
elder subsample, a specific regression technique is used to address the problem.  In 
the next section I describe this regression technique and define the model in terms of 
observables. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  Additional econometric theory and the model in terms of observables 
 
I intend to estimate equation (5).  In terms of observables we get: 
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where educ, region and occup stand for respectively educational, federal and 
occupational sets of dummies. 
The age earnings profile, f(agei-45), reflects the possible non-linear relationship and 
indicates that permanent income is evaluated at the age of 45. 
The cohort effect, c(agei), is included to allow for the influence of capital 
accumulation and technological progress on labour income.  Since I use a cross 
section, I have to impose a value (θ) for the relative importance of the cohort effect 
vis-à-vis the other explanatory variables.  In the regression analyses, I use 0.3, 0.5 and 
0.7.  The cohort effect was implemented as follows: (1) data on growth rates of 
nominal earnings and consumer price indices, obtained from Nationaal instituut voor 
de statistiek (1931-1995) en Institut national de statistique (1915-1930), gave average 
annual growth rates of real earnings, -0.26% before 1924, -0.57% in 1925-1934, -
3.86% in 1935-1944, 7.69% in 1945-1954, 3.93% in 1955-1964, 5.8% in 1965-1974, -
0.03% in 1975-1984 and 1.25% in 1985-1994.  (2) c(agei) is defined as a piecewise 
linear function that takes zero at the age of 45: 
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In section 2.2, I explained one has to restrict δ to a particular value (see equation (6)) 
to obtain estimates for Si.  It should be clear that the value is influenced by the number 
of explanatory variables included in (5) and (8), i.e. the more explanatory variables, 
the lower the value.  King & Dicks-Mireaux (1982) impose 0.5.  Their set of 
explanatory variables is, however, slightly larger than mine.  Therefore, I use 0.3, 0.5 
and 0.7. 
 
A second but more important caveat concerns the empirical content of Si, defined as 
unobservable individual characteristics.  Given the data limitations for the elder 
subsample (the data set only informs on past occupation), it may include more than 
unobservable individual characteristics.  Since past hours of work are not given for 
the retired, hours of work are not included in the vector of explanatory variables, and 
are thus reflected in Si.  “The individual effect, Si, may include variations in 
individual tastes for leisure, but it does not allow for systematic changes in annual 
hours worked resulting from spells of unemployment during part of the year, 
temporary lay-offs, or part-time work by wives or in retirement.” (cit., King and 
Dicks-Mireaux, 1982)  The solution is to estimate equation (8) on a truncated sample 
and to use the estimated parameters to predict permanent income for the entire 
sample.  Such a procedure would however result in sample selection bias.  The issue 
is addressed by means of the Heckit estimator (e.g. Greene, 1981, 2000, Heckman, 
1979 and Melino, 1982). 
 
The Heckit estimator consists of a three-step procedure. 
In the first step, one estimates a probit model on the entire sample to determine the 
probability to be in the truncated sample.  Since hours of work induce the problem of 
sample selection bias, I define a binary variable (trunc) that takes one (zero) if an 
individual works more than (less, including not working and retirement) 34 hours a 
week.5  In fact, I estimate the following probit model on the entire sample: 
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where hhi reflects the household structure and sahi, disci are sets of morbidity 
dummies. 
 
5 Employees claiming to work more than 34 hours a week but earning less than 30000 BEF, are 
deleted. 
In the second step one runs ols on equation (8) for the truncated sample (trunc equals 
one), but the inverse mill's ratio is included as an additional explanatory variable. 
Finally, the parameter estimates obtained from the two steps are used as starting 
values for maximum likelihood estimation. 
 
Another consequence of the omission of hours of work concerns the estimation of 
permanent income.  First, we impose that Ŝi equals zero for those individuals not in 
the truncated sample.  Second, equation (7) is changed to adjust explicitly for non-
participation in the labour force. 
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where the probabilities are obtained from equation (10), and Ēi denotes the average of 
individual labour income of those working less than 34 hours. 
 
5.  Results 
 
In section 5.1, I briefly describe the results for inequality in ill-health using income as 
stratification variable.  The estimates for permanent income and the resulting 
concentration indices are discussed in section 5.2. 
 
5.1.  Income-related inequality in ill-health 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, there isn't any income-related inequality in ill-
health among the 65+ in Belgium.  In table 3, I present the evidence. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
I used the variables from table 1 for the analysis.  The concentration indices were 
calculated using grouped data, i.e. ten socio-economic groups (defined as deciles).  
Since calculation based on grouped data nearly differed from calculation based on 
individual level data [CI(full sample)=-0.89, CI(65-)=-0.114, CI(65+)=-0.032] and 
since comparative research within the ECuity project uses grouped data (e.g. van 
Doorslaer et al., 1997), I use grouped data throughout the paper. 
 
The results can be summarised as follows: First, there is significant socio-economic 
inequality in ill-health, favouring the rich, among the whole population and among the 
65-.  Second, there is no statistical significant socio-economic inequality in ill-health 
among the 65+.  Third, socio-economic inequality in ill-health among the 65- is 
statistically significant higher than among the 65+. 
 
5.2.  Permanent income-related inequality in ill-health 
 
In this section, I first describe the estimates obtained by the Heckit estimator.  Next, I 
describe the estimates of permanent income, evaluated at the age of 45 and finally, the 
concentration indices, based on permanent income are dealt with. 
 
In table 4, the estimation results are depicted.6  In this estimation strategy, I imposed 
that one-half of the growth of real earnings is attributable to the cohort effect.  In the 
appendix, the estimation results for cohort effects of 30% and 70% are given.  I 
estimated separately for males and females, since joint estimation resulted in 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
The selection equation determines the probability to be in the truncated sample.  For 
both males and females, higher education results in a higher probability to be working 
more than 34 hours a week.  The relationship between age and working more than 34 
hours a week is highly non-linear (a fifth order polynomial fitted the data best), but 
indicates that the younger and older are less likely to be in the truncated sample.  
Income from financial assets has a positive influence for males (not for females).  It 
could mean that income from financial assets is a proxy for unobservable 
characteristics.  However, it might well be the case that a higher number of hours 
worked increases one's opportunity to build up financial assets (e.g., Miles, 1997).  
Family structure is not important for males.  Females are less likely to work more than 
34 hours if the number of household members is larger.  Finally, I included two ill-
health variables in the selection equation.  The coefficients indicate that males 
suffering from more severe illness are less likely to be in the truncated sample.  The 
inclusion of ill-health variables might appear strange, given that I ultimately want to 
examine the relationship between income and ill-health status.  However, no ill-health 
 
6 Trimming for 1 % outliers did not change the results qualitatively. 
variables were included in the earnings equation and the ill-health variables thus only 
pick up effects of sample selection bias. 
 
Next, I turn to the earnings equation.  Since most explanatory variables are 
represented by dummies, one can interpret the coefficients as percentage changes 
(against the suppressed dummy) in earnings.  First, higher education results in higher 
earnings.  Second, the age-earnings profile is linear.  Finally, the occupational 
dummies reflect that a male professional, farmer, company manager and executive 
has higher earnings than an unskilled labourer has.  This pattern is, however, less 
clear for females. 
The estimated coefficients are used to predict permanent income.  Equation (6) shows 
that Ŝi equals δ(Si + ui) for the observations in the truncated sample.  I impose that δ 
equals 0.5.  Since Ŝi cannot be estimated for individuals not in the truncated sample, 
those individuals get Ŝi equals zero.  Next, equation (7) and (11) are applied on both 
the male and female sample to obtain individual permanent incomes.  If one would 
use these permanent incomes to calculate concentration indices, one faces two 
problems.  First, the 'reference' concentration index is calculated based on equivalent 
income (see income in table 2).  Second and more importantly, one assumes that 
estimated individual permanent income reflects the socio-economic status of the 
individual.  This implies for example that a male with a high permanent income is a 
member of an advantaged socio-economic group, whereas his inactive wife belongs to 
a disadvantaged socio-economic group.  I address both problems by adding up the 
individual permanent incomes within each household to obtain household permanent 
income.  This procedure resulted in an additional number of missing values.  An 
individual may be included in the regression analysis, but some of the other household 
members may be excluded.  Deleting those households reduced the sample from 5548 
to 5110 observations.  In the following step, household permanent income is corrected 
for family structure, using (adults+0.5children)0.5 as equivalence scale.  Since 
permanent income is evaluated at the age of 45 years, the number of children denotes 
the number the individual has when he was/is/will be 45 years.  Finally, I calculated 
concentration indices based on equivalent permanent income. 
 
In table 5, estimated equivalent permanent income, the 'reference' concentration 
indices and concentration indices based on permanent income are given.  In the 
appendix, the results of various sensitivity analyses are shown. 
 
[Table 5] 
 
Estimated equivalent permanent income was obtained by applying the above-
described procedure (cohort effect equals 0.5, Ŝi = 0.5(Si + ui) for persons in the 
truncated sample and non-participation in the labour force is adjusted for). 
The 'reference' concentration indices are based on 5110 observations of equivalent 
income (see table 2).  Comparing them with the concentration indices of table 3, we 
observe that all indices slightly increase.  Apparently the reduction in the number of 
observations, required to make meaningful comparisons with the concentration 
indices based on permanent income, results in a slightly higher socio-economic 
inequality in ill-health.  Turning towards statistical significance, the conclusions 
nearly change.  There is still significant socio-economic inequality in ill-health, 
favouring the rich, among the entire population and the 65-.  Moreover, the difference 
in socio-economic inequality in ill-health between the 65- and 65+ still holds.  Only 
with respect to the socio-economic inequality in ill-health among the 65+, the 
conclusions change, i.e. we have pro-rich inequality.  However, a simple t-test shows 
that the CI(65+) does not significantly differ from –0.005.  It is to be hoped that the 
limited deviation of the concentrations indices based on the reduced sample (table 5) 
from the concentration indices based on the original sample (table 3), indicates that 
the reduction of observations was random. 
The concentration indices based on equivalent permanent income differ from those 
based on equivalent income.  Nevertheless, the basic conclusions remain unchanged.  
The estimation of permanent income, however, invokes several assumptions.  
Therefore, the results of alternative estimation strategies are depicted in the appendix 
(table A.3).  It is seen that the results are most sensitive to the imposed cohort effect.  
The higher the imposed cohort effect, the more significant is the difference in socio-
economic inequality in ill-health between the 65- and 65+.  In other words, the more 
important capital accumulation and technological progress are thought of for the 
explanation of the growth of real earnings, the higher (and the more significant) is the 
difference between the concentration indices of the 65- and 65+.7 
A last remark concerns the appropriateness of using self-assessed health.  Its use 
seems more or less justified in the context of equivalent income ('reference' 
concentration index) since ill-health as well as income are measures of current 
individual status.  Permanent income, however, is not necessarily a characteristic of 
one's current status.  Therefore, one could argue to use a ' permanent' or 'life-cycle' ill-
 
7 In seeking an explanation, I thought of the following: a higher cohort effect reduces, ceteris paribus, 
the importance of the age-earnings profile (see equation (5)).  The coefficients on the individual 
characteristics, however, should remain unchanged (and they do not differ significantly, see table 4, 
A.1 & A.2).  As such the difference in predicted permanent income (see equation (7)) should stem from 
the unobservable individual characteristics or from the cohort effect.  I checked whether the 
unobservables differ significantly across the imposed cohort effects and they did not.  As such, we 
have, and this is a tentative explanation indeed, an indication that the imposition of higher cohort 
effects results in increased diverg
health measure.  Mortality is frequently used within this context.  Work on the 
relationship between mortality and self-assessed health, however, has indicated that 
self-assessed health is an important predictor of mortality (e.g., Idler and Angel, 1990 
and Kaplan and Camacho, 1983). 
 
Another way to check the robustness of the results, consists of calculating 
concentration indices based on other measures of socio-economic status.  Since I am 
primarily interested in the 65+ and since I have to take into account the limitations of 
the data set, I choose rental value of houses.  The (rental) value of houses might be a 
good indicator of the socio-economic status of the elderly.  Accumulation of income 
and (wealth) may be reflected in the value of houses indeed, yet it is far from a perfect 
indicator.  Does a household living in a large, high-valued house (e.g. a country-
house), thereby possibly incurring high maintenance costs, attains a higher socio-
economic status than a household living in a small, slightly lower valued house?  
Other examples can be thought of. 
Additional problems arise because some households are proprietors and others are 
tenants.  The tenants answer the following question: "How much rent do you pay for 
your house?"  The proprietors face another question: "How much rent would you have 
to pay if you didn't own the house?"  First, misreporting and problems encountered if 
measuring stated preference, might be more crucial for the proprietors.  They are 
probably less accustomed with the current values in the rental market than tenants are.  
Moreover, strategic motives might result in conscious over- or understatement of the 
rental value of the house.  Second, tenants actually have to pay the rental value of the 
house, whereas proprietors do not have to.  For younger households, the problem may 
                                                                                                                                                                      
younger.  This could lead to a more significant difference in socio-economic inequality in ill-health 
between both subsamples. 
not be that compelling, since proprietors probably are paying off a 'housing' loan.  For 
the elderly this argument is less convincing and thus points to possible 
incomparability of tenants and proprietors.  I address the problem by means of the 
following procedure: First, I calculate concentration indices for the entire population, 
i.e. tenants and proprietors.  Next, the focus is on the subsamples.  In table 6, the 
concentration indices based on rental values are depicted.  Note that once again I use 
the same equivalence scale to correct the rental value of houses for family structure, 
i.e. (adults+0.5children)0.5. 
 
[Table 6] 
It is immediately seen that the incorporation of rental values points to a somewhat 
different pattern than the analysis based on income and permanent income.  There is 
still significant socio-economic inequality in ill-health among the 65- and among the 
full sample, but the difference between 65- and 65+ is only statistically significant if 
one restricts the attention to tenants.  Two conclusions could be drawn, but it is not 
clear which of both is to be preferred.  First, one could conclude that the distinction 
between the 65- and 65+ is not existing.  However, this implicitly implies that the 
rental value of houses is a better indicator of one's socio-economic status than 
(permanent) income.  Second, one may conclude that evidence on differences in 
socio-economic inequality in ill-health between the 65- and 65+ is at best mixed.  
Further research should focus on other measures of socio-economic status and the 
analysis could be replicated for other countries to test the stated hypothesis, i.e. socio-
economic inequality in ill-health among the 65+ is limited or even not existing.8 
 
8 Another possibility for future research consists of using decomposable measures.  They do not suffer 
from the 're-ranking' problem.  Moreover, they can be used to determine the relative contribution of the 
inequality in a subgroup to overall inequality.  However, the current state of the art, as far as I know, 
 6.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I focused on socio-economic inequality in ill-health, i.e. are the poorer 
members in better (worse) health than the richer members of society are?  This 
research question is closely connected with the research undertaken within the ECuity 
project.  Since the ECuity project undertakes comparative research of health care 
systems across European countries, a specific methodology to quantify (and thus to 
compare) socio-economic inequality in ill-health was developed.  First, the population 
is ranked in terms of socio-economic status.  Second, concentration curves and indices 
are calculated to quantify the inequality. 
 
The specificity of this paper concerns the use of permanent income as stratification 
variable instead of income.  I opted to use permanent income since there doesn't seem 
to exist any income-related inequality in ill-health among the 65+.  The variation in 
income among the 65+ is rather limited (because of welfare benefits) and it is thus not 
a priori clear whether the absence of inequality stems form the limited variation in 
income (assuming that the variation is underestimated, e.g. income from financial 
assets, etc.) or truly reflects reality.  The estimation strategy of permanent income was 
based on the methodology proposed by King & Dicks-Mireaux (1982). 
 
In the empirical part of the paper, I used Belgian data for 1994. 
First, I replicated the analysis already undertaken within the ECuity project and 
complemented it with analyses of subsamples of the Belgian population, i.e. the 65- 
                                                                                                                                                                      
makes them useless since they cannot be applied to two attributes (being socio-economic status and ill-
health) simultaneously. 
and 65+.  I found that there is significant income-related inequality in ill-health in 
Belgium, favouring the rich.  The analysis of the subsamples pointed out that 1) 
income-related inequality in ill-health among the 65- is favouring the rich, 2) it is 
absent for the 65+ and 3) inequality among the 65- is significant higher than among 
the 65+. 
Second, I calculated concentration indices based on permanent income for the same 
(sub)sample(s).  The basic conclusions remained unchanged (indicating that the 
limited variation in the income of the 65+ is not driving the result).  However, one 
should be cautious in interpreting the results too literally, because the estimation of 
permanent income invoked several assumptions. 
To check the robustness of the results, I did the analysis over again using rental value 
of houses as a measure of socio-economic status.  The difference between the 65- and 
65+ turned out to be insignificant. 
In my opinion, there is evidence on the absence of socio-economic inequality in ill-
health among the 65+ indeed, yet the evidence is fragile and further exploration is 
needed. 
Appendix 
 
Various sensitivity analyses of the estimation of permanent income are given in this 
appendix.  Table A.1 and A.2 depict the estimation results of the Heckit estimator for 
cohort effects of 30% and 70%. 
 
[Table A.1] 
 
[Table A.2] 
 
Table A.3 gives an overview of concentration indices based on different estimation 
strategies for permanent income. 
 
[Table A.3] 
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Table 1: descriptive variables: income-related inequality 
 obs mean stdev description 
income 5926 48312 24521 equivalent income: household income/(adults+0.5*children)0.5 
sah1 5926 0.24 0.43 self assessed health: how is your health in general? very good 
sah2 5926 0.49 0.50 self assessed health: how is your health in general? good 
sah3 5926 0.22 0.42 self assessed health: how is your health in general? moderate 
sah4 5926 0.04 0.20 self assessed health: how is your health in general? bad 
sah5 5926 0.01 0.09 self assessed health: how is your health in general? very bad 
sex 5926 0.48 0.50 1=male; 0=female 
age 5926 46.50 18.49  
Table 2: descriptive variables: permanent income-related inequality 
 obs mean stdev description 
income 5110 48127 24200 equivalent income: household income/ (adults+0.5*children)0.5 
sah1 5548 0.25 0.43 self assessed health: how is your health in general? very good 
sah2 5548 0.49 0.50 self assessed health: how is your health in general? good 
sah3 5548 0.21 0.041 self assessed health: how is your health in general? moderate 
sah4 5548 0.04 0.19 self assessed health: how is your health in general? bad 
sah5 5548 0.01 0.08 self assessed health: how is your health in general? very bad 
sex 5548 0.48 0.50 1=male; 0=female 
age 5548 44.01 17.08  
labinc 5548 35519 136072 net individual labour income 
educ1 5548 0.16 0.37 no or primary education: 1=yes; 0=no 
educ3 5548 0.29 0.45 higher secondary school: 1=yes; 0=no 
educ4 5548 0.31 0.46 higher education: 1=yes; 0=no 
educ5 5548 0.02 0.14 graduate-level education: 1=yes; 0=no 
wal 5548 0.44 0.50 inhabitant: 1=Wallonia; 0=otherwise 
brus 5548 0.12 0.32 inhabitant: 1=Brussels; 0=otherwise 
finas 5548 0.20 0.40 income from financial assets: 1=yes; 0=otherwise 
adult 5548 3.09 1.33 number of adults 
child 5548 0.71 1.02 number of children (under 16 years) 
out 5548 0.28 0.45 children - outdoors & independent: 1=yes; 0=otherwise 
disc1 5548 0.02 0.13 chronic illness: 1=maximum discomfort; 0=otherwise 
disc2 5548 0.04 0.19 chronic illness: 1=severe discomfort; 0=otherwise 
disc3 5548 0.07 0.25 chronic illness: 1=moderate discomfort 
disc4 5548 0.02 0.15 chronic illness: 1=limited discomfort; 0=otherwise 
disc5 5548 0.02 0.13 chronic illness: 1=no discomfort; 0=otherwise 
self 5548 0.04 0.20 self-employed: 1=yes; 0=otherwise 
farm 5548 0.01 0.09 farmer: 1=yes; 0=otherwise 
prof 5548 0.02 0.13 professionals (lawyers, GP, etc.): 1=yes; 0=otherwise 
comp 5548 0.004 0.07 company manager: 1=yes; 0=otherwise 
whol 5548 0.001 0.03 wholesale dealer: 1=yes; 0=otherwise 
selfr 5548 0.01 0.11 self-employed - residual category: 1=yes; 0=otherwise 
skil 5548 0.13 0.33 skilled worker: 1=yes; 0=otherwise 
emp 5548 0.26 0.44 employee: 1=yes; 0=otherwise 
exec 5548 0.11 0.31 executive: 1=yes; 0=otherwise 
empr 5548 0.03 0.16 employee – residual category: 1=yes; 0=otherwise 
 
Table 3: income-related inequality in ill-health in Belgium in 1994 
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 5926 4678 1248 
CI -0.090* -0.112* -0.031 
se (CI) 0.0122 0.0225 0.0185 
hypothesis testing (t-values)   
65-   -2.78 
*: significant at 5% 
Table 4: maximum likelihood estimation (cohort effect: θ = 0.5) 
probability to be in the truncated sample: dependent variable is trunc     
 males  females  
 coefficient standard error coefficient standard error 
educ1  -0.322* 0.123  -0.184 0.134 
educ3  0.066 0.095  0.321* 0.092 
educ4  0.117 0.048  0.390* 0.094 
educ5  0.492* 0.093  0.626* 0.228 
wal  -0.239* 0.072  -0.139 0.071 
brus  -0.370* 0.106  0.235 0.102 
age-45  1.470* 0.283  1.228* 0.374 
(age^2)-(45^2)  -0.045* 0.011  -0.042* 0.015 
finas  0.433* 0.089  0.230 0.094 
adult  0.061 0.035  -0.177* 0.039 
child  -0.116 0.049  -0.190* 0.046 
out  -0.084 0.098  -0.262 0.122 
sah2  0.033 0.078  -0.052 0.076 
sah3  -0.291* 0.107  -0.216 0.103 
sah4  -1.230* 0.258  -0.452 0.280 
sah5  -1.141* 0.228  -0.448 0.187 
disc1  -0.479* 0.160  -0.291 0.118 
disc2  -0.612* 0.232  -0.558 0.342 
disc3  -0.334 0.143  -0.433 0.175 
disc4  -0.127 0.216  -0.274 0.347 
disc5  0.062 0.260  0.277 0.310 
estimation of earnings equation: dependent variable is ln(labinc)     
educ1  -0.088 0.069  -0.139 0.320 
educ3  0.069 0.044  0.101 0.074 
educ4  0.193* 0.048  0.208* 0.079 
educ5  0.273* 0.083  0.318* 0.081 
wal  0.031 0.032  -0.049 0.054 
brus  0.015 0.049  -0.004 0.072 
age-45  0.027* 0.002  0.027* 0.004 
finas  0.080 0.035  0.100 0.055 
self  -0.036 0.083  0.037 0.185 
farm  0.587* 0.093   
prof  0.419* 0.107  0.681* 0.198 
comp  0.458* 0.094  0.892* 0.270 
whol  -0.176 0.244  -2.347 4.138 
selfr  0.920* 0.156  -0.719 4.179 
skil  0.009 0.085  -0.047 0.282 
emp  0.001 0.091  0.125 0.185 
exec  0.232* 0.092  0.294 0.201 
empr  -0.134 0.416  -0.088 0.757 
obs    2709     2829  
log likelihood  -2056   -1531  
Constants are suppressed; in the probability to be in the truncated sample, f(age-45) was approximated by a fifth order 
polynomial; farm is excluded since no female claims to be farmer; *:  significant at 1% 
Table 5: descriptive variables of permanent income and permanent income-related 
versus income-related inequality in ill-health in Belgium in 1994 
descriptive variables    
 obs mean stdev description 
perm 5110 37661 81107 equivalent permanent income 
'reference' concentration indices    
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 5110 4358 752 
CI -0.101* -0.118* -0.035* 
se (CI) 0.0151 0.0208 0.0178 
hypothesis testing (t-values)    
65-   -3.03 
concentration indices based on equivalent permanent income    
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 5110 4358 752 
CI -0.112* -0.117* -0.041 
se (CI) 0.0169 0.0212 0.0229 
hypothesis testing (t-values)    
65-   -2.44 
*: significant at 5%.  Permanent income (perm) was calculated assuming the following: 1) cohort effect: 0.5, 2) Ŝi equals 0.5(Si + 
ui) for the individuals in the truncated sample and equals zero for individuals not in the truncated sample, 3) equation (7) and (11) 
are used.  The 'reference' concentration index is based on equivalent income. 
 
Table 6: housing value-related inequality in ill-health in Belgium in 1994 
concentration indices for tenants and proprietors    
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 5110 4358 752 
CI -0.091* -0.103* -0.064* 
se (CI) 0.0121 0.0180 0.0205 
hypothesis testing (t-values)    
65-   -1.43 
concentration indices for proprietors    
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 3830 3254 576 
CI -0.052* -0.054* -0.042 
se (CI) 0.0090 0.0059 0.0204 
hypothesis testing (t-values)    
65-   -0.57 
concentration indices for tenants    
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 1280 1106 174 
CI -0.071* -0.098* 0.013 
se (CI) 0.0278 0.0203 0.0509 
hypothesis testing (t-values)    
65-   -2.03 
*: significant at 5%. 
Table A.1: maximum likelihood estimation (cohort effect: θ = 0.3) 
probability to be in the truncated sample: dependent variable is trunc     
 males  females  
 coefficient standard error coefficient standard error 
educ1  -0.322* 0.123  -0.184 0.139 
educ3  0.066 0.095  0.321* 0.093 
educ4  0.117 0.048  0.390* 0.096 
educ5  0.492* 0.093  0.626* 0.227 
wal  -0.239* 0.072  -0.139 0.072 
brus  -0.370* 0.106  0.235 0.103 
age-45  1.470* 0.282  1.228* 0.368 
(age^2)-(45^2)  -0.045* 0.011  -0.042* 0.015 
finas  0.433* 0.089  0.230 0.094 
adult  0.061 0.035  -0.177* 0.039 
child  -0.116 0.049  -0.191* 0.046 
out  -0.084 0.097  -0.262 0.122 
sah2  0.033 0.077  -0.052 0.076 
sah3  -0.291* 0.105  -0.216 0.103 
sah4  -1.230* 0.255  -0.452 0.280 
sah5  -1.141* 0.226  -0.448 0.188 
disc1  -0.479* 0.154  -0.291 0.120 
disc2  -0.612* 0.225  -0.558 0.341 
disc3  -0.334 0.139  -0.433 0.173 
disc4  -0.127 0.214  -0.274 0.349 
disc5  0.063 0.257  0.277 0.310 
estimation of earnings equation: dependent variable is ln(labinc)     
educ1  -0.080 0.068  -0.133 0.297 
educ3  0.066 0.044  0.091 0.074 
educ4  0.202* 0.048  0.196* 0.072 
educ5  0.272* 0.083  0.309* 0.081 
wal  0.035 0.032  -0.043 0.054 
brus  0.023 0.049  -0.006 0.072 
age-45  0.020* 0.002  0.021* 0.004 
finas  0.071 0.035  0.094 0.055 
self  -0.033 0.080  0.040 0.183 
farm  0.586* 0.088   
prof  0.424* 0.104  0.685* 0.196 
comp  0.463* 0.091  0.883* 0.271 
whol  -0.127 0.252  -2.362 4.141 
selfr  0.932* 0.151  -0.729 4.188 
skil  0.010 0.083  -0.048 0.281 
emp  0.004 0.087  0.128 0.183 
exec  0.234* 0.090  0.296 0.198 
empr  -0.109 0.349  -0.086 0.784 
obs    2709     2839  
log likelihood  -2078   -1533  
Constants are suppressed; in the probability to be in the truncated sample, f(age-45) was approximated by a fifth order 
polynomial; farm is excluded since no female claims to be farmer; *: significant at 1% 
Table A.2: maximum likelihood estimation (cohort effect: θ = 0.7) 
probability to be in the truncated sample: dependent variable is trunc     
 males  females  
 coefficient standard error coefficient standard error 
educ1  -0.322* 0.122  -0.184 0.134 
educ3  0.066 0.095  0.321* 0.092 
educ4  0.117 0.048  0.390* 0.094 
educ5  0.492* 0.093  0.626* 0.228 
wal  -0.239* 0.072  -0.139 0.071 
brus  -0.370* 0.106  0.235 0.102 
age-45  1.470* 0.282  1.228* 0.376 
(age^2)-(45^2)  -0.045* 0.010  -0.042* 0.015 
finas  0.433* 0.089  0.230 0.094 
adult  0.061 0.036  -0.177* 0.039 
child  -0.116 0.050  -0.191* 0.046 
out  -0.084 0.098  -0.262 0.122 
sah2  0.033 0.078  -0.052 0.076 
sah3  -0.291* 0.107  -0.216 0.103 
sah4  -1.230* 0.258  -0.452 0.281 
sah5  -1.141* 0.226  -0.449 0.189 
disc1  -0.479* 0.154  -0.291 0.120 
disc2  -0.612* 0.233  -0.558 0.339 
disc3  -0.334 0.142  -0.433 0.175 
disc4  -0.127 0.214  -0.274 0.344 
disc5  0.063 0.261  0.277 0.309 
estimation of earnings equation: dependent variable is ln(labinc)     
educ1  -0.095 0.069  -0.144 0.334 
educ3  0.072 0.044  0.111 0.074 
educ4  0.185* 0.049  0.220* 0.075 
educ5  0.275* 0.084  0.328* 0.081 
wal  0.026 0.032  -0.056 0.055 
brus  0.006 0.049  -0.002 0.073 
age-45  0.034* 0.002  0.033* 0.004 
finas  0.089 0.036  0.107 0.054 
self  -0.040 0.083  0.035 0.181 
farm  0.589* 0.094   
prof  0.414* 0.108  0.676* 0.194 
comp  0.453* 0.094  0.901* 0.265 
whol  -0.225 0.236  -2.333 4.133 
selfr  0.908* 0.159  -0.708 4.170 
skil  0.007 0.085  -0.045 0.273 
emp  0.001 0.091  0.123 0.181 
exec  0.229* 0.090  0.292 0.197 
empr  -0.159 0.445  -0.090 0.699 
obs    2709     2839  
log likelihood  -2061   -1533  
Constants are suppressed; in the probability to be in the truncated sample, f(age-45) was approximated by a fifth order 
polynomial; farm is excluded since no female claims to be farmer; *: significant at 1% 
Table A.3: concentration indices based on permanent income: sensitivity analyses 
CI based on permanent income: 1) cohort effect: 0.3, 2) Ŝi equals 0.3(Si + ui) for the individuals in 
the truncated sample and equals zero for individuals not in the truncated sample, 3) equation (7) and (11) are used. 
  
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 5110 4358 752 
CI -0.111* -0.126* -0.070* 
se (CI) 0.0200 0.0318 0.0279 
hypothesis testing (t-values)   
65-   -1.32 
CI based on permanent income: 1) cohort effect: 0.5, 2) Ŝi equals 0.3(Si + ui) for the individuals in 
the truncated sample and equals zero for individuals not in the truncated sample, 3) equation (7) and (11) are used. 
  
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 5110 4358 752 
CI -0.126* -0.133* -0.041 
se (CI) 0.0258 0.0320 0.0228 
hypothesis testing (t-values)   
65-   -2.34 
CI based on permanent income: 1) cohort effect: 0.7, 2) Ŝi equals 0.3(Si + ui) for the individuals in 
the truncated sample and equals zero for individuals not in the truncated sample, 3) equation (7) and (11) are used. 
  
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 5110 4358 752 
CI -0.146* -0.143* -0.013 
se (CI) 0.0241 0.0313 0.0197 
hypothesis testing (t-values)   
65-   -3.52 
CI based on permanent income: 1) cohort effect: 0.3, 2) Ŝi equals 0.5(Si + ui) for the individuals in 
the truncated sample and equals zero for individuals not in the truncated sample, 3) equation (7) and (11) are used. 
  
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 5110 4358 752 
CI -0.107* -0.119* -0.070* 
se (CI) 0.0184 0.0262 0.0277 
hypothesis testing (t-values)   
65-   -1.29 
CI based on permanent income: 1) cohort effect: 0.7, 2) Ŝi equals 0.5(Si + ui) for the individuals in 
the truncated sample and equals zero for individuals not in the truncated sample, 3) equation (7) and (11) are used. 
  
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 5110 4358 752 
CI -0.120* -0.128* -0.014 
se (CI) 0.0129 0.0216 0.0199 
hypothesis testing (t-values)   
65-   -3.88 
*: significant at 5%. 
Table A.3: continued 
CI based on permanent income: 1) cohort effect: 0.3, 2) Ŝi equals 0.7(Si + ui) for the individuals in 
the truncated sample and equals zero for individuals not in the truncated sample, 3) equation (7) and (11) are used. 
  
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 5110 4358 752 
CI -0.105* -0.115* -0.068* 
se (CI) 0.0180 0.0260 0.0272 
hypothesis testing (t-values)   
65-   -1.25 
CI based on permanent income: 1) cohort effect: 0.5, 2) Ŝi equals 0.7(Si + ui) for the individuals in 
the truncated sample and equals zero for individuals not in the truncated sample, 3) equation (7) and (11) are used. 
  
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 5110 4358 752 
CI -0.106* -0.111* -0.041 
se (CI) 0.0143 0.0177 0.0226 
hypothesis testing (t-values)   
65-   -2.44 
CI based on permanent income: 1) cohort effect: 0.7, 2) Ŝi equals 0.7(Si + ui) for the individuals in 
the truncated sample and equals zero for individuals not in the truncated sample, 3) equation (7) and (11) are used. 
  
 full sample  65- 65+ 
obs 5110 4358 752 
CI -0.104* -0.120* -0.013 
se (CI) 0.0064 0.0190 0.0200 
hypothesis testing (t-values)   
65-   -3.88 
*: significant at 5%. 
 
